A Cauldron of fire in Sulaymaniyah: Is This the End of the Kurdish Conflict?

This is an additional dispatch for this week as today marks a historic moment for Turkey, for the Kurdish movement, and for the broader Middle East.

In Sulaymaniyah, a solemn ceremony unfolded: nearly 40 PKK militants, including the senior commander Bese Hozat, appeared before a crowd of 200. They declared the end of the armed struggle but in their own words, “by our own will.” One by one, the militants approached a flaming cauldron and cast their weapons into the fire.

The symbolism was unequivocal. Burial, after all, suggests the possibility of retrieval. What is buried can be unearthed. But fire signifies finality. In other words, what burns does not come back. At least not in the same way.

So, is this really the end of the Kurdish conflict? Or just the end of one phase? Let’s walk through the key questions briefly, and clearly.

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Has the PKK truly ended? What could still derail the process?

Nothing is ever fully certain in this region, but I believe this is the closest we’ve come to the end of the PKK as we know it—as the organization founded 40 years ago to defend Kurdish rights through armed struggle and with the aim of an independent Kurdish state. That era is over. Not because the Turkish state demanded it, but because the strategic visions of Abdullah Öcalan and Turkey’s security apparatus have aligned for the first time in decades.

This is why we saw Devlet Bahçeli, of all people, take the lead in initiating talks with Öcalan—a moment that caught everyone off guard. But it was not accidental. Bahçeli is pushing hard for the process to move forward. Erdoğan, by contrast, is taking his time. And that’s risky. The longer this drags on, the more space there is for provocation and sabotage.

I want to underscore something here: this shift is not simply about pressure from Ankara. The Kurdish movement has made a strategic choice. Öcalan has been saying since 1993 that the armed struggle should eventually end. Over time, especially through its engagement with the Turkish state and more recently through alliances with American and European actors in Syria, the movement has recognized that it is strongest in politics rather than the battlefield. Kurdish actors today are some of the most resilient, legitimate, and sharp political forces in Turkey, Syria and the wider Middle East. They are fierce negotiators, astute politicians, and often kingmakers. The armed wing, in many ways, had become a burden to that broader strategy.

So yes, I believe this is the end of the PKK as an armed entity. But not the end of the Kurdish movement. It will evolve, as it has many times before. And that evolution is being shaped by its own agency and political calculation.

Still, there are dangers. The first is Erdoğan himself. In 2015, he abandoned the peace process when it didn’t serve his electoral calculus. That could happen again, though it seems less likely now. One reason is that his key partner Bahçeli seems fully invested.

The second is Syria. Talks between the SDF and the Sharaa govt are in deadlock. That’s a regional vulnerability. But Öcalan remains a joker card in the Syrian game, which is why Turkey’s security elites want this process to continue regardless of what Erdoğan does.

And finally, there’s Israel. Deeply uneasy about Turkey’s growing influence in Syria, it could act as a spoiler. Any military escalation in northern Syria targeting Kurdish forces could derail the process altogether.

So we’re at a critical moment. A strategic convergence has made this possible. But if it’s allowed to drift, we’ve seen before how fast these windows can slam shut.

In short: we are at the edge of a breakthrough. But we’ve seen breakthroughs collapse before.

What must happen now for this to become lasting peace?

Disarmament is only the first page of a new chapter. For peace to be real, Turkey must go beyond backchannel coordination and begin to transform its institutions. That means accepting Kurdish actors as legitimate political agents, not security threats.

Yes, there have been steps suchÖcalan’s access to advisors has widened, and he’s been allowed to speak more freely. But that alone won’t sustain peace. The Kurdish movement has already taken the greater risk. Now the state must act in kind.

That means:

• Halting the criminalization of Kurdish parties, language, and identity

• Ending the state seizure of elected Kurdish municipalities and the ‘lawfare’ against the main opposition CHP

• Creating durable mechanisms for open political dialogue, not secretive negotiations

And above all, it means building structures that outlast Erdoğan. As long as this process hinges on one man’s calculations, it will remain fragile. Peace requires political will and constitutional protection.

What might this mean for Kurdish citizens of Turkey?

That’s the real test. Disarmament might end the war, but it doesn’t bring justice. For many Kurds, peace is not just the absence of violence—it’s the presence of dignity. That means recognition of their language, their culture, their elected representatives. It means seeing Kurdish politicians in Parliament, not prison. And it means ending the practice of confiscating Kurdish mayorships and dismantling elected local administrations, which continues today without apology.

But how likely is meaningful change? At the moment, not very. The state has done almost nothing in return. Kurdish politicians and activists remain behind bars. And the media and judiciary remain stacked against them.

The Kurdish movement, though, has been clear about this: the Kurdish question is not a narrow ethnic grievance. It is a question of Turkey’s democratic consolidation and rule of law. You cannot resolve the Kurdish issue while simultaneously attacking the main opposition party CHP, jailing a new set of politicians every week on vague charges of corruption or organized crime.

Still, there’s a shift. The Kurdish movement has emerged from decades of war more politically sophisticated, more connected, and more central to Turkey’s future than ever before.

So the expectations are clear But whether those expectations become policy depends on whether the state responds with meaningful reform or tries to contain the process with superficial gestures remains to be seen. So far, it looks like the former.

How does this affect Erdoğan’s hold on power?

That depends on whether he takes ownership or stays aloof. It also depends on his ‘lawfare’ against the main opposition party CHP which is causing

If Erdoğan delivers a formal settlement, he could once again recast himself—this time as the statesman who ended a generational war. But right now, he’s playing it safe. Bahçeli is the one out front. That tells us Erdoğan hasn’t decided whether peace helps or hurts him politically.

In 2015, he walked away when he couldn’t control the outcome. He could do the same again. But the stakes are different now. He no longer courts Kurdish votes. He depends on Bahçeli—and Bahçeli is all in.

Still, unless Erdoğa builds something real, I do not think this moment will enhance his grip. On the contrary, it may just expose how weak it has become.

What about Öcalan himself? Is his release realistic? Or relevant, for that matter?

His release is not imminent and frankly, it’s not the point. In a recent and historic video from İmralı, where he appears alongside members of his prison secretariat, he makes two things very clear. First, that this process is unfolding with his full consent. In his words, “All these developments have resulted from the meetings I have held in İmralı… great care has been taken to ensure that these meetings are held on the basis of free will.”

Second, he explicitly says he does not care about his own personal freedom. “Philosophically,” he says, “the freedom of the individual cannot be abstracted from the freedom of society.” Whether you believe that or not is beside the point. What matters is that the process—the PKK’s disbandment—is not contingent on Öcalan being freed. That decision has already been made by the Kurdish movement. It will be implemented.

There’s another layer here, too. Öcalan has long expressed concerns for his own safety if he were to leave İmralı. He has said, repeatedly, that he believes Mossad is pursuing him that he is the wedge between Israel and the Kurdish movement. Whether that’s true or not doesn’t change the logic. He has chosen to remain under the protection of the Turkish state.

So the question of his freedom is symbolic, but not decisive. He is already leading this transition—from prison. And that, once again, shows his enduring influence as a political strategist.

What are the regional consequences—and how should Europe respond?

If the PKK truly transitions into a political formation, the ripple effects will be dramatic.

In Syria, it would alter the Kurdish power dynamic with Damascus. In Iraq, it could lead to a recalibrated security relationship between Ankara and the KRG. In Iran, it might unsettle Tehran’s control of its Kurdish periphery.

But the larger picture is this: the Kurdish movement, shaped by Öcalan’s ideology, spans four countries and has emerged as the most resilient, secular, and organized political actor in the region. This is an opportunity not just for the Middle East, but for Europe.

The Kurdish leadership has been clear as can be seen from DEM Party’s most recent visit to Berlin and London that they want European backing for this process. They are asking for diplomatic support, pressure on Ankara to follow through, and a defense of democratic space across the region. This is no longer just about a Turkish domestic issue. It actually never was.

We are witnessing the end of an armed struggle but possibly the beginning of something deeper. A reordering of political life in Turkey and beyond. The Kurdish question has always mirrored the state of Turkish democracy. Perhaps now, it can help remake it. I sincerely hope that will be the case.