Fragments & Findings: ‘Enjoy Saudi,’ Egypt’s Leverage, Yemen’s Aid Battles

This week, I bring you a few stories from the region told in fragments. Saudi Arabia hosts comedians, Egypt maneuvers at Rafah, and the Houthis turn aid into a weapon.

Comedy-Washing in Riyadh

Riyadh is set to host the first-ever Riyadh Comedy Festival from 26 September to 9 October 2025 at Boulevard City. It is billed as the world’s largest gathering of comedic talent and forms part of Riyadh Season under Vision 2030. The line-up includes more than 50 international and regional comedians, among them Dave Chappelle, Kevin Hart, Russell Peters, Gabriel Iglesias, Pete Davidson, Chris Tucker, Bill Burr, Aziz Ansari, Jimmy Carr, and Louis C.K.

Saudi officials present the event as proof of cultural openness and as a step toward positioning the capital as a global hub. Yet the contradictions are stark. Critics accuse the performers of accepting vast paycheques to perform in a country where Jamal Khashoggi was murdered inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018 on the orders of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and where political dissent continues to be criminalized. Some of these comedians also run weekly podcasts with tens of thousands of subscribers, where freedom of speech and cancel culture in the United States are endlessly dissected. When the subject turns to Saudi Arabia, however, the tone shifts. Jim Jefferies, speaking on his own podcast, brushed off criticism by saying:

“You don’t think our governments fucking bump people? Oh, I think Jeffrey Epstein was fucking bumped off. You know what I mean? … One reporter was killed by the government. Unfortunate, but not a f***ing hill that I’m gonna die on.”

One reporter killed by government? He really doesn’t know what he is talking about, does he?

The disappointment and frustration surrounding this festival stem from the nature of comedy itself. At its core, comedy is an act of rocking the boat, whatever the boat happens to be in a given time and place. When comedians appear to act purely on financial interest, it strikes audiences as hypocritical. One Reddit user captured this sentiment about one of the comedians: “Bill Burr is the epitome of a comedian who makes fun of power dynamics efficiently yet somehow has never reflected on his own privileges, like, at all. He genuinely doesn't seem to grasp the sociological concepts behind any of it. He's just good at calling people out in a brazen manner. By no means has he done the work.”

And it really does not make their decision more palatable when they argue that the United States is as bad as the Saudi government, does it. The defense is familiar: Western governments also commit atrocities, and engagement with Saudi audiences is portrayed as a form of cultural bridge-building. To many observers it sounds hollow. What does this show? Something we know too well. You can buy anything, and I mean anything, with enough money.

As the festival’s umbrella platform tied to the Kingdom’s General Entertainment Authority suggests: Enjoy Saudi! (at the expense of your principles.)

Egypt: Leverage Unused

Egypt has deployed some 40,000 troops, along with armour and air defences, across northern Sinai and along the Rafah border, a build-up that exceeds the limits of the 1979 peace treaty with Israel. Officially, the move signals Cairo’s determination to resist any mass displacement of Palestinians into Sinai. In practice, it reflects both real anxiety about instability on its border and a desire to show resolve without directly confronting Israel.

Yet a recent piece in Truthout asks the obvious question: “Egypt Has Leverage Against Israel. Why Doesn’t Sisi Use It?”. On paper, Egypt controls Rafah. In reality, Israel’s grip on the Philadelphi Corridor has stripped Cairo of effective sovereignty, and the government has chosen caution over confrontation. It has policed its own citizens more aggressively than the siege itself, arresting and deporting activists who tried to march to the border.

In the meantime, the same government has also signed a $35 billion gas deal with Israel’s Leviathan field. It is the largest export agreement in Israel’s history, and the volumes sent to Egypt will rise almost every year, making dependency firmer and Israel stronger.

But we know this leitmotif of politics, don’t we? Sisi and Erdoğan may dislike each other intensely, yet they are remarkably alike. Like Sisi, Erdoğan’s government offers the same hollow words of solidarity with the Palestinians, while business with Israel goes on undisturbed.

In an ideal world with ideal leaders, Cairo could help bring the stalemate into sharper relief by sponsoring international delegations to Rafah, making the blocked convoys visible, or convening diplomatic initiatives that force Israel’s hand. Instead it performs this… What is this? Neutrality? That hardly seems the right word.

Yemen: Aid and authority

Yemen’s war is deepening on multiple fronts. After an Israeli airstrike killed Houthi Prime Minister Ahmed al-Rahawi and several senior officials, the movement retaliated not only with missile activity in the Red Sea but also by storming UN offices in Sanaa and Hodeidah. At least 11 humanitarian workers from WFP, WHO, and UNICEF were detained, with reports later raising the figure to 19. The raids drew condemnation from UN Secretary-General António Guterres and envoy Hans Grundberg, but the Houthis showed no sign of backing down.

These arrests mark a new phase. Since 2019, the Houthis have steadily brought aid operations under their control through the Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, using it to regulate staffing, direct distribution, and occasionally divert supplies. Detaining UN employees takes that logic to its extreme. Relief has been reduced to leverage. What should be lifelines are treated as bargaining chips, folded directly into the battlefield calculus. Since 2019 the Houthis have tried to tax aid programs, criminalized independent donations, and delayed projects for months with endless permits. Aid workers report harassment, confiscated equipment, and colleagues who simply vanish. Humanitarian access is no longer neutral terrain. It is a front line in the war, switched on and off whenever it suits the movement’s grip on power.

The Houthis’ grip on humanitarian aid is not accidental but integral to their strategy of rule. By forcing all agencies through their Supreme Council, they project themselves as the sole authority in northern Yemen, erasing the remnants of the internationally recognized government. Aid becomes one of the few reliable resources in a collapsed economy, diverted to feed fighters, reward loyalists, and make communities dependent on their patronage. It also provides a surveillance tool, since controlling staffing and beneficiary lists allows the movement to monitor society and choke off independent networks. Blocking convoys or detaining UN staff turns relief into leverage, a bargaining chip with foreign powers as well as local rivals. Wrapped in the language of sovereignty and resistance to outside interference, this control gives the Houthis both ideological cover and material advantage, even as it deepens the suffering of Yemenis.