Kurds: A Key Actor in the Game of Middle Eastern Thrones
The Kurdish movements in four countries are at a crossroads and so is the region. The future of the Middle East may depend on how they on how they are positioned and by whom.
Israel’s attack on Iran must have revealed to some—especially among the opposition in Turkey—the deeper motives behind Turkey’s most recent negotiations with the Kurdish movement, which culminated in the PKK’s announcement of disarmament and disbandment. A monumental event in the forty-year conflict between the Turkish state and the armed leftist group, the PKK.
The unfolding of this process has been covered in earlier posts, so I won’t revisit it here. But I would like to reiterate a few important points and summarise my arguments so far.
This process—made public around November 2024—is a curious one. It is led by the hawkish nationalist leader Devlet Bahçeli and the PKK’s founder, Abdullah Öcalan, who has been imprisoned on İmralı Island for 26 years. It is curious because Bahçeli, who just a year ago was still calling Öcalan a “babykiller” and “terrorist chieftain,” now not only pushes for a deal with him but congratulates his wisdom and refers to him as the leader of the Kurds (Kürt önderi). In the exact parlance of the Kurdish movement. Shocking. Or maybe not.
The rational question is: what changed? What happened in the life of Turkey or Bahçeli that the leader of Turkish nationalism has reversed his position vis-à-vis the PKK and Öcalan so drastically?
There may be multiple answers, but the most conspicuous and closer to the truth is this: the shifting fear and opportunity structure that has unravelled in the Middle East since October 7 pushed Turkey’s security and intelligence apparatus to reopen talks with Öcalan. Öcalan, who has long been critical of Israel’s regional game plan, now finds himself seeing things largely the same way the Turkish state does. Or vice versa. They are on the same page, and Israel’s expansionist posture has only proven them right.
According to several sources, Öcalan had sent a letter around January 2025 to Syrian Kurdish commander Mazlum Abdi after the fall of Assad, warning that the era of armed struggle had ended. Those who did not lay down arms, he said, would meet their end through external coercion—citing the examples of Hezbollah and Hamas. For Öcalan, this new negotiation process is an opportunity to speak directly and freely to Kurdish movements across the region: to the KRG in Iraq, PJAK in Iran, the SDF in Syria, and the PKK in Qandil and elsewhere—Öcalan aims to draw them all into the realm of party politics, safely and strategically, transforming them into legitimate political actors. While PJAK and the SDF regard Öcalan as their overarching leader, and the KRG does not, he still holds considerable influence over key factions within Iraqi Kurdistan.
Öcalan reiterated his longstanding view, first articulated in and around 1993, that statehood is a trap for the Kurds, and that it is far more advantageous to be pivotal political actors within existing states than to pursue a nation-state of their own. His remarks, made at this volatile hour in the Middle East, have drawn criticism from parts of the Kurdish elite, particularly in Europe. For the first time, we are witnessing Öcalan being openly and harshly criticised from within his own movement. This is to be expected. At critical moments, social movements and armed organisations fracture. Some cadres will accept the new line; others will resist. What matters now is that Öcalan and many influential Kurdish leaders believe the current regional chaos and Israel’s expansionist ambitions can only be countered if PKK-affiliated groups coordinate with each other - hence the meeting of the first Kurdish Unity Conference in May - and Turkey and resist Israel’s attempts to draw them into alliance.
Let’s hear what they’re saying.
First, Öcalan. In late April, he met with a few representatives from the DEM Party on İmralı. The notes from that meeting were leaked, likely by members of the Kurdish movement who wanted to prove he was “selling out the struggle.” Ironically, Öcalan addresses that very claim in the meeting itself. He also appears to foresee Israel’s attack on Iran.
“Israel is a substance with an extremely high explosive value. It wants to draw the Kurds into this process of ‘Gaza-ification.’ The only obstacle in its path is me. I hear that some within the PKK are angry, saying: ‘If he [Öcalan] were out of the way, we’d be ready to launch the real war now.’ That would be a disaster. That is exactly what I mean by Gaza-ification.
Netanyahu and Trump have struck a new deal. They are drafting plans. They want to establish Israel as the hegemonic power shaping strategy in the Middle East. It’s a five-phase plan. Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria—those were the first three. Now two remain: Iran and Turkey.
And the indispensable element of this strategy is the Kurds. So how is Israel seizing this relationship? How does it want to use it? At this moment, Israel’s only concern is removing me. Qandil [refers to the PKK leadership] cannot prevent this. Geographically, Qandil is under Iran’s influence, and the SDF is under Israel’s. Only I can stop this.”
Many may wonder: how can a man who has been imprisoned on an island for over two decades remain so perceptive about regional dynamics? I think the answer has two parts. First, he spent twenty years in Syria and Lebanon as the leader of an armed group before his capture in 1999. He knows the terrain. He knows the actors. Second, for years, his only visitors have been Turkish intelligence and military officials. Through these meetings, he may have received limited but strategically significant intelligence updates.
Despite the rifts within the Kurdish movement over disarmament, the majority still stands behind Öcalan.
Another imprisoned leader, Selahattin Demirtaş, released a public letter in the wake of Israel’s attack on Iran. I believe his words were directed at two different audiences.
First, the Turkish state. His emphasis on the need to move quickly in the negotiation process reflects the shared concern of Öcalan and the PKK: they require legal guarantees before formally laying down arms. These guarantees must come swiftly. Before the process becomes vulnerable to sabotage. Demirtaş also forcefully condemned the ‘lawfare’ campaign against the opposition CHP, whose mayors—including Istanbul’s Ekrem İmamoğlu—are currently imprisoned.
Second, Demirtaş was speaking to Kurdish nationalists who oppose the disbandment of the PKK. Those who criticise Öcalan’s position and see, in the chaos created by Israel, a new chance to establish a Kurdish state and view Israel as a potential ally.
“For many years, the Iranian regime has denied its citizens the most basic democratic rights and human freedoms. This is a profound injustice to its own people. But no injustice can ever justify imperial intervention. Our priority must be the immediate cessation of military operations against Iran and a return to the negotiating table.
Yet it appears that imperial interventions in the Middle East will not stop until their architects believe they have achieved their aims. In such a time, no one should entertain reckless or adventurous moves driven by narrow calculations. These will only lead to catastrophe. Let us not forget: imperialism does not give unless it gains a thousandfold.
As the people of Turkey, we must stand together. In the face of possible threats, attacks, and provocations, we must become—if necessary—a people’s army of 86 million, stretching from Edirne to Hakkari, ready to defend our shared homeland with our lives.
We will also resolve our internal problems among ourselves, through mutual trust and in the spirit of brotherhood. Any other path will only bring disaster. In this, we will reject vengeful anger and bitter retribution. We will act with courage and sincerity.”
Bese Hozat, a senior PKK leader, also seems aligned with both Öcalan and Demirtaş. In a recent interview:
“There can be no democracy in Amed [Diyarbakır, the main Kurdish majority city in southeast Turkey] if there is fascism in Istanbul. The Kurdish question cannot be resolved unless Turkey democratizes.
Israel’s attack on Iran is part of global capital’s broader project to redesign the region. And Turkey is next in line.
We are acting according to our strategy of self-defense and the democratic nation. We are not dependent on any power.
If Turkey does not pursue a democratic solution to the Kurdish issue, a major catastrophe will be inevitable. Everyone must do their part for peace.”
In summary, there is a fragile but unmistakable consensus among Kurdish leaders in Turkey on several key points:
That Israel is playing a strategic game of thrones, aiming to become the regional hegemon with a nuclear monopoly.
That, contrary to the hopes of some Kurdish nationalists, this is not the moment to pursue a state of Kurdistan with Israeli backing. Doing so would be detrimental to all Kurdish entities.
That they agree with the Turkish state in identifying Israel as a real threat.
That the peace process is extremely vulnerable. To external sabotage, internal dissent, and, crucially, to the whims of Erdoğan.
Indeed, from leaked notes, we gather that Öcalan feels personally threatened. He believes Mossad is after him, and acknowledges that Turkish intelligence has, for some time, been protecting him from an Israeli decapitation plot.
The elephant in the room…
You may have noticed that I haven’t yet mentioned the elephant in the room: Turkey’s omnipotent president, Erdoğan. That’s because he has chosen not to be seen as the public driver of this process. Yet it is obvious that neither Bahçeli nor Öcalan could have initiated this without his approval.
Still, Erdoğan doesn’t appear to be embracing this process politically; at least not the way he did during the last peace initiative in 2013. As a politician who lives and dies by the polls, he saw in 2015 that the process had not boosted the AKP’s vote share. On the contrary, it allowed the Kurdish party to crash through the electoral threshold and become a kingmaker. When the rise of Kurdish autonomous entity in southeast Syria, Rojava coincided with this, he quickly lost his appetite. The process collapsed, triggered, by the still-unsolved killing of two policemen in the southeast. What followed was a nightmare: full-blown guerrilla war and a rapid slide into deeper authoritarianism.
In my view, there are many threats to this current process. Most may come from outside—from the Middle East’s moving tectonics. But there are dangers within the PKK, and within the Turkish state itself. And most of all, there is Erdoğan.
What I fear most is Erdoğan changing his mind. Losing interest. We have seen him do it before. He has the power to shape the narrative, to reframe any misstep as necessary. Even after a blow, he can move on. The question is—will he? Sadly, the answer depends on his own cost–benefit calculus.
In my 2017 book, Frontline Turkey, on the Kurdish issue and the 2013 peace process, I ended with a train allegory. I wrote: “As I write this, there is a Kurdish train leaving Syria and Turkey carrying a huge load of baggage: a load of despair, hate, anger and remorse, but also of love and hope for a better and more peaceful Middle East.”
I believe a Kurdish train is once again pulling away from the wreckage of war. This time with an even heavier cargo: the memory of betrayal, the weight of fractured alliances, the danger of new traps. But also, still, the same stubborn hope. If this train derails now, it will not be because the Kurdish people lacked vision or courage. It will be because the region’s powers chose fear over imagination and domination over peace. The choice remains. But the track is narrowing.
Thanks for this brilliant update!