One Imprisoned Man’s Words, Two Countries at a Crossroads
The Kurdish question is a tangled web of negotiations, pressure, and power struggles between Ankara and Damascus. Will anything shift if the imprisoned leader is allowed to speak?
The relationship status of Kurds with Turkey and Syria: Extremely complicated. Love bombing, then ghosting—peppered with gaslighting.
Let’s remember: Turkey has been engaged in a negotiation process—the thing, as I’ve called it here—with Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the outlawed PKK. Calling it a peace process or a conflict resolution effort would be generous, given the circumstances. Ankara’s objective is clear: to have Öcalan call for PKK disarmament.
At the same time, Turkey is twisting Damascus’ arm, pressuring it to dismantle the autonomous cantons in Rojava (Western Kurdistan in Kurdish), which are controlled by the SDF. The SDF is led by the YPG, the Syrian offshoot of the PKK. Basic facts, but worth repeating—Kurdish politics is an abbreviation soup, and people lose track.
SDF leader Mazlum Abdi, who sees Öcalan as a father figure, has repeatedly reaffirmed his loyalty and on several occasions stated that he learned from him. But he’s also made the tangled situation clear: “In reality, we are still at war with Turkey and its proxies. Turkish jets and drones continue to bomb us. In Damascus, it remains unclear what steps the new government will take. Their statements are positive, but they are under pressure from Turkey to act against the areas under our control.”
But Turkey isn’t the only player in this Kurdish theater. France is pushing for greater recognition of Kurdish rights. Israel—an occupying force in southeastern Syria—plays a different game, using colonial tactics to pit factions against each other while presenting itself as a protector of minorities: Druze, Alawites, Kurds. A source within the SDF-led administration told me recently that Israeli interlocutors maintain constant contact, offering “protection.”
Two processes are unfolding simultaneously—one in Turkey, one in Syria. Distinct, but deeply connected.
The first, as mentioned above, is between the Turkish state and the Kurdish movement in Turkey, with Öcalan at the centre. The PKK’s leadership is waiting for a message from him—not a written note, but a video. Partly due to trust issues.
The PKK leadership, through their own media, sometimes via pen-named commentaries, keep repeating that Reber Apo (as they call Öcalan) is about to make a historic call, one that would have implications not only for Turkey but the wider region - the Middle East. Recently, some of the mid-level militants also came out and stated that they’ll abide by Öcalan’s call.
But the PKK’s leadership remains firm on a video message. The Turkish Justice Ministry refuses to allow it. The reason for this standoff is simple: for the PKK, a video would be far more effective in convincing mid- and low-level commanders—the backbone of the organization’s structure. Moments like these, when armed groups enter conflict resolution negotiations, are also moments of potential splintering and defections. The leadership needs the rank and file to believe in the process. That’s why they insist on a video.
For the Turkish state, however, a video carries a different risk—it could easily turn into a propaganda or mobilization tool. Counterproductive and self-defeating.
The second process is in Syria. The SDF has shown willingness to negotiate with Damascus, but only under a decentralized framework that preserves Kurdish autonomy. That’s why, despite being Syria’s second-largest ethnic group and controlling nearly a third of its territory, they weren’t invited to the Syrian National Dialogue Conference. No surprise there—Damascus had made it clear: no disarmament, no seat at the table. The conference itself, which gathered around 4,000 people from across Syria, was more symbolic than substantive. A message was sent: a constitutional committee will be formed, transitional justice mechanisms established, and Israeli occupation condemned. But exclusion from the talks doesn’t mean negotiations between the SDF and Damascus are permanently dead. Stalled, yes. But not beyond revival.
And yet, the process in Turkey hinges on Syria. The process in Syria hinges on Turkey.
Today, the Kurdish DEM Party will visit Öcalan in İmralı prison for the third time. A press conference will follow. In Diyarbakır and Van—two cities at the heart of Turkey’s Kurdish southeast—and Qamishli, a Kurdish city in northeastern Syria, giant screens have been set up in the main squares. Crowds will gather, waiting to hear what the delegation returning from İmralı has to say.
One imprisoned man’s words hold sway over two countries. The question is: will Turkey let him speak? And if it does, will his message be enough to shift the gears toward peace and democracy—when so many other players stand to gain from keeping the Kurdish conflict deadlocked in both Turkey and Syria?
Not the First Call for Peace—Will It Be the Last?
Yes, Öcalan’s message matters. Kurdish movements in Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria are all poised to listen. But let’s not forget—this isn’t the first time he has called for peace. Around this time twelve years ago, his message urging an end to armed struggle was read to the crowds in Diyarbakır and broadcast live on every major TV channel in Turkey. It was Newroz, and there was hope—real hope—that this was the beginning of peace, the start of democratic reforms.
It didn’t end well.
There were many factors, some beyond the control of both the Turkish state and the Kurdish movement. But some missteps were theirs alone. The list of mistakes and pivotal moments could fill a book—which, incidentally, I’ve written. Since 2013, both Turkey and Syria have undergone profound transformations, most of them painful for their people.
Let’s hope the lessons of the last failed peace process aren’t wasted this time.