Turkey’s gamble with the Kurdish question in Syria
I spoke with one of the top politicians of the Syrian Kurds—here’s the current state of affairs and its broader implications.
A couple of days ago, I had the opportunity to meet and spend time with some members of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—the Kurdish-led group governing northeast Syria, known as Rojava or Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES)—including Ilham Ahmed, their de facto foreign minister. Ahmed is an astute and poised politician, deeply attuned to the complexities of Syria and the wider region.
Let me share what I learned from them about their primary obstacles, objectives, and aspirations for the near future.
The main challenge
Turkey remains their foremost obstacle. Through its influence over the interim HTS government, led by Ahmad al-Sharra, and its direct military offensives against Kurdish-controlled areas, Turkey maintains relentless pressure on the SDF.
The SDF also believes that the conditions Ahmad al-Sharra presented during his meeting with SDF leader Mazlum Abdi were not independent demands but directives originating from Ankara.
With this understanding, the SDF and Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) recognize that addressing their primary challenge necessitates direct negotiations with Turkey. They have been attempting this for some time, but Turkish officials categorically refuse to engage directly. This forces the SDF to rely on American, British, and French intermediaries. At the end of December, Mazlum Abdi announced via his X account that the SDF was prepared to establish “a demilitarized zone in the city of Kobani, with the redeployment of security forces under American supervision and presence. This initiative aims to address Turkey's security concerns and ensure lasting stability in the region.”
While the U.S. and France supported the proposal and offered personnel to oversee the arrangement, Turkey declined.
Through intermediaries, the SDF also proposed joint management of the oil and mineral resources in the territories under its control with Turkish companies. Recognizing the AKP and Erdoğan’s reliance on a clientelist network of business elites, this was a strategically smart offer by the Kurds. Yet, Turkish officials rejected this overture as well.
The Öcalan Dilemma
This situation raises the question: What exactly is the endgame of the transactional process—“the thing,” as I have called it a while ago in this publication —that Turkey has initiated with the Kurdish movement? The Turkish state is now engaging with Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned Kurdish leader of the PKK (designated a terrorist organization by Turkey, the US, and the EU, and active in Turkey’s southeastern region and beyond), hoping that he will call for the PKK’s disarmament and persuade the Syrian Kurds to abandon their aspirations for autonomy. In essence, Ankara seeks the dismantling of the institutions and governance structures painstakingly established in Rojava over the past decade.
This is a two-pronged strategy. The first—PKK disarmament—may be achievable. The second—Öcalan advocating for the dissolution of Rojava’s administration—is highly improbable.
When I asked Ilham Ahmed about this, she remarked, “Öcalan may play a pivotal role if Turkey ceases its attacks on Syrian Kurdish positions.” She also noted that “the non-Syrian actors, as Turkey calls them—namely the PKK members currently in Rojava—would leave under Turkey’s conditions in a state of peace.”
The deadlock
The deadlock stems from Turkey’s inflexible posture. Is this rigidity a calculated negotiating tactic, or is Ankara truly incapable of recognizing that a cooperative relationship with the Kurdish entity in northern Syria would benefit both Turkey and the region?
If it’s the latter, then Ankara’s approach—its refusal to engage directly with the SDF, its influence over HTS, and its ongoing military offensives—becomes not only counterproductive but incoherent.
Broader context
It is crucial to recognize that Assad’s fall would not necessarily lead to a stable Syria. The country’s future hinges on addressing the fractures within it before they coalesce into larger ruptures that could engulf the entire state.
Pushing the Kurds, Alawites, Druzes towards Israel: These communities, wary of a government with roots in al-Qaeda, are actively seeking protection and remain in regular contact with the Kurds through their committees. Israel has already begun exploiting their vulnerability and is likely to deepen its ties with these groups. Turkey’s rigidity is driving not only the Kurds but also the Druze and Alawites toward Israel, which already controls parts of southern Syria, such as al-Quneitra.
Israel – Turkey rift: In the meantime, the relationship between Turkey and Israel remains highly volatile. A government commission, led by former Israeli National Security Council chief Jacob Nagel, issued a report on the future of the IDF, warning that ‘Turkey’s ambitions to restore its Ottoman-era influence could lead to heightened tensions with Israel, possibly escalating into conflict.’ The report further ‘highlights the risk of Syrian factions aligning with Turkey, which could pose a significant and emerging threat to Israel’s security.’ This precarious state of affairs between Turkey and Israel must not be overlooked.
Bound to Hezbollah : Despite its reduced regional sway, Iran remains a potent destabilizing force in Syria. Just last week, on January 18, HTS intercepted a shipment of Iranian-made Shahed-101 drones and other weaponry destined for Hezbollah. The contents were confiscated at the Tartus border, where the truck was stopped.
Trump’s Abraham Accords : With Trump in power, his administration is prioritizing an expansion of the Abraham Accords and normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia. If successful, this strategy diminishes Turkey’s role as a key mediator in the region, sidelining Ankara in favor of stronger U.S.-led alliances. This makes it even more urgent for Turkey to reassess its rigid policies and seek middle ground with the Kurdish administration in Syria.
A Ticking Bomb: The ISIS Camps Guarded by Kurds
It is a nightmare—the crisis point in a Hollywood war movie, where resolution comes from a mighty American army, institution, or superhero. Yet, as history since World War II has shown, such narrative arcs rarely translate to real life. Only the crisis point does.
There are 9,000 ISIS prisoners from over 50 countries detained in more than a dozen SDF-guarded facilities in Syria. During his recent visit to American personnel in Syria, U.S. CENTCOM Commander Michael Erik Kurilla described the situation as "a literal and figurative 'ISIS Army' in detention."
Both the al-Sharra government and Turkey have demanded the Kurdish administration hand over these detainees. The Kurds, however, insist on prosecuting the ISIS members in Syria, where their crimes were committed, or repatriating them to their home countries. Yet no one wants to take responsibility.
In addition to these detainees, the al-Roj and al-Hol camps house 40,000 individuals affiliated with ISIS to varying degrees. These camps are a humanitarian and security disaster—a ticking bomb that, in my view, is being exploited recklessly by all parties involved.
Who was left out of Hamas’ thanks?
Following the exchange of hostages as part of the ceasefire deal between Hamas and Israel, the spokesperson for Hamas’ military wing, the al-Qassam Brigades, Abu Ubeida, released a video commending the steadfastness of the Palestinian people and expressing gratitude to supporters of the Palestinian cause. He named Yemenis, Lebanese, Iraqis, Iranians, Jordanians, and Maghrebis but conspicuously excluded Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt from his acknowledgments.