What to Make of the Trump–Netanyahu Spectacle on Erdoğan
Trump’s theatrics may thrill Ankara’s loyalists, but they complicate Erdoğan’s already fragile balancing act in Syria. What looked like a win could just as easily fuel regional suspicions.
Pro-AKP trolls, masquerading as journalists in what we still generously call newspapers were euphoric after the latest Oval Office spectacle, where Trump, seated next to Netanyahu, seemed to pull a pseudo- ‘one minute’ moment. Turning toward the Israeli prime minister, he urged him to be “reasonable” regarding Turkey’s role in Syria. Almost like an Erdogan of 2009 objecting Shimon Peres at Davos. Unlike, those headlines in pro-government media arguing an historic win for Erdogan against Netanyahu, I doubt that more serious foreign policy advisers in Ankara are as amused by this theatre.
And not just any theatre—this was a production starring three of the most cunning tricksters of our time. Two in the room. One as the topic of the moment. To analyze this meeting through the usual IR or foreign policy frameworks would be a categorical error. These press briefings—when a foreign leader is present—are designed by Trump for ratings, not substance. They are choreographed for emotional effect. One would be better off binge-watching The Apprentice than perusing the textbooks of Fawcett1 or Hinnebusch2 to extrapolate on the situation.
Just look at this gem from Trump on Turkey’s supposed role in ousting Assad:
“Now, with that being said, I believe it was Turkey, and I said that to him [Erdoğan]. I said it. I said, ‘Congratulations. You’ve done what nobody’s been able to do in two thousand years. You’ve taken over Syria, with different names, but same thing. I said, ‘You’ve taken it over.’ He’s taken it over through surrogates. He goes, ‘No, no, no, no, no, it was not me.’ I said, ‘It was you. But that’s okay. You don’t have to say.’ ‘Well, it sort of maybe was me.’ Okay. But what he did, he’s a tough guy. He’s very smart. And he did something that nobody was able to do. You know? You gotta hand it to him.”
Come again? “You’ve done what nobody’s been able to do in two thousand years. You’ve taken over Syria”? Astaghfirullah and which two thousand years are we referring to, exactly? Someone’s clearly ripped out a few pages from Trump’s picture-book version of history—assuming he even flips through it.
But none of this was supposed to be the topic of the meeting. Look how we get sucked into the spectacle.
Here’s the real issue: Israel has been lobbying Washington for months to curtail Turkey’s growing influence in Syria. The final straw came after Ahmad al-Sharra’s first official visit to Ankara, which produced a strategic security agreement between Turkey and the HTS-led Syrian administration. The deal grants Turkey access to Syrian airspace for training, allows for the operation of two Turkish military bases, and outlines plans for Ankara to train the restructured Syrian army.
By current estimates, Turkey has around 10,000 troops on the ground in Syria. Its military expertise, technological capabilities, and longstanding networks in the country make it the most efficient actor to oversee the rebuilding of Syrian military infrastructure. More importantly, Erdoğan’s security apparatus—particularly intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan—has close ties with Ahmad al-Sharra and his circle.
Unsurprisingly, this alarms Israel.
The deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations, which began in the AKP’s second term, has turned from quiet estrangement into open distrust. Turkey—while always a vocal supporter of Palestinian statehood—maintained fruitful intelligence and military ties with Israel for decades. But Erdoğan’s rapport with Hamas leaders and his tendency to act on personal grievances have turned Turkish presence in Syria into something Israel now views as a direct threat—on par with Iranian encroachment.
In fact, security and intelligence assessments from both sides now flag each other as threats. Despite statements from both Fidan and his Israeli counterpart claiming they do not wish to clash directly in Syria, Israeli strikes continue to hit military targets where Turkish personnel are present.
This is why Netanyahu’s Oval Office visit had a clear objective: he wanted Trump to rein in Turkey.
And Trump, true to form, responded with bravado for the cameras:
“As you remember, we got our minister back from Turkey. You remember that? And this was a big deal at the time, and we got him back. And I told the prime minister, I said, just, Bibi, if you have a problem with Turkey, I really think I’m going to be able to work it out. I have a very, very good relationship with Turkey and with their leader.”
Let’s not forget how Trump “worked out” the Brunson affair.
Andrew Brunson, a pastor who had lived in Izmir for over two decades, was arrested following the 2016 coup attempt on charges of espionage and links to both the PKK and the Gülenists (now referred to as FETÖ and considered a terrorist organization by the Turkish state). Trump secured Brunson’s release after two years through a mix of threats and economic pressure.
A year later, in a now-infamous letter to Erdoğan, he warned him not to move Turkish forces into northern Syria, where the PYD/YPG—the Kurdish forces allied with the U.S. in the fight against ISIS—were based: “You don't want to be responsible for slaughtering thousands of people, and I don't want to be responsible for destroying the Turkish economy—and I will. I've already given you a little sample with respect to Pastor Brunson.”
The letter ended with: “Don’t be a tough guy. Don’t be a fool. I will call you.”
So no, Trump’s apparent praise for Erdoğan shouldn’t be taken at face value. Yes, Netanyahu didn’t get what he came for—not yet. And you could read the frustration on his face as Trump monologued about Erdoğan “taking over Syria.” But that doesn’t mean Washington has given Ankara full support, or that it’s a garden of roses for Turkey in Syria.
On the contrary, Trump’s language—“taking over Syria,” “surrogates”—cuts straight to the image Erdoğan and Fidan have spent years trying to avoid.
Turkey’s deep involvement with Ahmad al-Sharra and HTS has already unsettled regional powers. Unlike its mentorship of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or Ennahda in Tunisia, this project carries heavier strategic implications and offers Ankara far more room to maneuver. Syrian state institutions, for the most part, remain a kind of tabula rasa, a blank slate for the AKP to shape as it sees fit. And that fact is not lost on anyone in the region. This is precisely why Turkey seeks to stabilize Syria not unilaterally, but with backing from Saudi Arabia and the UAE—both to legitimize and to bankroll the operation. But that alliance is fragile. Arab states, wary of Ottoman nostalgia and Turkish patronage, are reluctant to be seen as junior partners.
And while their capacity remains limited for now, Ahmad al-Sharra and his HTS-led team would strongly resist being cast as Turkish surrogates. Fidan knows this—and carefully packages Ankara’s involvement to avoid triggering old wounds.
Trump, of course, has no such tact. His “2,000-year” history lesson was a disaster. His “surrogate” language muddles the very image Ankara wants to preserve. Put another way, if Trump frames Turkey’s bid to stabilize Syria as a colonial enterprise – which he did -, Erdoğan risks attracting Arab resentment rather than support.
Therefore, while the regime’s echo chamber in Ankara may be celebrating, the more serious operators in Erdoğan’s inner circle are watching with unease, not confidence.
Watch this space
Two significant meetings are set to take place in the coming days. The first involves Erdoğan and a delegation from the pro-Kurdish DEM party, which has recently met with the imprisoned PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan. As you may recall, Öcalan previously called on the PKK—and by extension its Syrian offshoot, the PYD, which leads the SDF in northern Syria—to disarm and dissolve. The next step is to determine when, where, and how the PKK will hold a congress to formalize this decision. While the PKK leadership has indicated a willingness to comply, they insist Öcalan himself must attend the congress—a condition that seems improbable. The upcoming meeting with Erdoğan may shed some light on how this process could unfold.
The second meeting is with Syrian president Ahmad al-Sharra—the man of the hour, in some sense. He is expected to meet Erdoğan on the sidelines of a security summit in Antalya. On the table: the future of Turkey’s two military bases in Syria. As discussed earlier in this newsletter, the outcome is critical. We may know more next week—or we may not.
Louise Fawcett, ed., International Relations of the Middle East, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023).
Raymond Hinnebusch, The International Politics of the Middle East, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015).
Thanks for this concise rendering of the situation ("2000 years..." - these days I just cannot bear having to follow the nonsense Trump utters anymore ... feels like such a waste of all if our precious time ... but this one made me grin widely: you managed to make an impressionistic sketch of the situation with all the right journalistic brushstrokes - particularly scholarly people don't always have this ability. I relish wherever I may find this rare gift 😃
Btw: I could not resist ordering both of your books for my birthday because I think if I have both it will be like a little remote seminar of your work and thus I will buy your Wendy Pearlman recommendation a bit later this year or in the next ("We crossed the bridge and it trembled" and "The home I worked to make" both sound incredibly interesting - thanks for the heads up!)
Great analysis! It’s such an interesting dynamic between those three, and as we have learnt, Trump does like people who have a lot of cards, which Erdogan surely does (probably more than Netanyahu).